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Abstract
Economic mechanisms administer the allocation of resources to interested agents based on
their self-reported types. One objective in mechanism design is to design a strategyproof pro-
cess so that no agent will have an incentive to misreport its type. However, typical analyses
of the incentives properties of mechanisms operate under strong, usually untestable assump-
tions. Empirical, data-oriented approaches are, at best, under-developed. Furthermore, mech-
anism/policy evaluation methods usually ignore the dynamic nature of a multi-agent system
and are thus inappropriate for estimating long-term effects. We introduce the problem of es-
timating the causal effects of mechanisms on incentives and frame it under the Rubin causal
framework (Rubin, 1974, 1978). This raises unique technical challenges since the outcome
of interest (agent truthfulness) is confounded with strategic interactions and, interestingly, is
typically never observed under any mechanism. We develop a methodology to estimate such
causal effects that using a prior that is based on a strategic equilibrium model. Working on the
domain of kidney exchanges, we show how to apply our methodology to estimate causal effects
of kidney allocation mechanisms on hospitals’ incentives. Our results demonstrate that the use
of game-theoretic prior captures the dynamic nature of the kidney exchange multi-agent sys-
tem and shrinks the estimates towards long-term effects, thus improving upon typical methods
that completely ignore agents’ strategic behavior.
Keywords: causal inference, multiagent systems, equilibrium effects, mechanism design
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1 Introduction
A mechanism defines the rules that are used to determine the allocation of resources to interested
parties in an economic transaction. For example, an online ad auction determines the winners
of the advertisement slots and the appropriate payments, based on advertisers’ reports (bids). In
designing mechanisms, a key requirement is to have good incentives properties, so that agents have
no incentive to misreport their valuations. Such strategyproof mechanisms are appealing for being
strategically simple for agents, and can lead to desirable outcomes because this agent behavior can
be anticipated and leveraged for good effect.
There are a few general procedures for devising strategyproof mechanisms. One key idea is to
determine the payment of an agent i as a function of the reports of all agents excluding i. Along
with allocating the desired resources to this agent given the prices it faces, the intuition is that
agent i will have no incentive to misreport since this will not affect the utility given fixed reports
from others. This idea underlies the Vickrey auction (Vickrey, 1961) and its generalization in
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973). For example, in the
Vickrey auction, the highest bidder wins the item but pays the second highest bid and thus, there is
no incentive for the highest bidder to reduce the initial bid.
However, and even when strategyproof mechanisms can in principle be designed, theoretical
analyses of their incentive properties rely critically on assumptions that are strong or untestable in
practice. Typical assumptions include: no collusion among agents; (ii) the rationality of partici-
pants; (iii) that the types (such as valuations) of agents are correctly modeled (e.g., they are private
values and don’t depend on information of others); and (iv) that the strategic interactions have
been correctly modeled. But without getting these assumptions correct, the incentive properties
of a mechanism will not be as desired. For example, if participants in a single-item second price
(Vickrey) auction can collude then one bidder can submit a high bid while others withhold their
bids. In another example, if the problem is truly multi-round then participants have a new incentive
to shave down their bids in order to get the best price for an item across time.
In this light, there remains a large opportunity for empirical methods in the design of mecha-
nisms, especially in estimating the causal effects of mechanisms on incentives, and other outcomes
of interest (such as welfare, revenue and so forth.) Across many online platforms such as ad
auction platforms, one wants to be able to make changes to the design across subsets of the pop-
ulation and be able to estimate the effect of these design decisions on economic properties if one
was to run a single design on the whole population vs run some other design. In this paper we
adopt the Rubin causal framework (Rubin, 1974, 1978) using the potential outcomes notation. Our
goal is to estimate the causal effects of mechanisms on the incentives of agents, after agents have
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been randomly assigned to participate in one mechanism (viewed as a treatment) and their reports
have been observed. This raises unique technical challenges since the outcome of interest (agent
truthfulness) is typically never observed under any mechanism. Furthermore, we assume that data
collection (agent reports) happens before the system has reached an equilbrium and so, we are in-
terested in a methodology that will strike a sensible balance between observed data and equilbrium
considerations.
There is a developing body of work on experimention of online, socio-economic systems, but
it is not developed within the potential outcomes framework and has not studied the special ques-
tion of causal analysis in regard to incentive properties. In related work, large field experiment
conducted at Yahoo! in 2008, aimed to estimate the effects of increased reserve prices on keyword
revenue (Ostrovsky & Schwarz, 2011). The applied method was to use a “diff-in-diffs” estimator
that completely ignores all aforementioned subtleties. Other work aims to estimate the effects of
interventions in a machine learning model underlying a mechanism (e.g. (Bottou et al., 2012)), but
the methods are usually predictive (i.e. predict all missing outcomes through a model based on one
intervention and the observed outcomes). Equilibrium effects for causal inference has first been
proposed in the econometric literature (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005). However, no general method-
ology has been proposed for the estimation of long-term causal effects of policies/mechanisms.
Other work has considered the empirical design of mechanisms in settings where the goal of
strategyproof design is unachievable in combination with other desirable properties, or cannot be
supported from an analytical framework (Lubin & Parkes, 2009). This appeals to the divergence
between distributions over payments (or payoffs) in an incentive-aligned mechanism and distribu-
tions over payments (or payoffs) in another candidate design, with the view to finding the optimal
mechanism through online search. But this work does not adopt a causal approach, but rather as-
sumes the ability to switch the entire population through alternate designs and thus does not have
the difficulty of estimating counterfactuals. Moreover, the work does not adopt our viewpoint of
looking to make inferences from empirical frequences about reported types about the incentive
properties of the mechanism.
2 Causal effects on incentives
We consider a population ofN agents, indexed by i in some natural ordering, and two mechanisms
M1 and M0. Each agent will be randomized to participate in one mechanism only (thus the
mechanisms can be viewed as treatments that agents receive). Specifically, if agent i participates
in M1 then Zi = 1 and if agent i participates in M0 then Zi = 0. We also consider a setting
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where the mechanisms are multi-round, each round being indexed by t, for t = 1, 2, · · ·T and a
maximum number of rounds T . At each round t of any mechanism, each agent samples a type
θit from a type space Θ according to some distribution F and selects a strategy Yi(z, t) ∈ {0, 1}.
Given the sampled type, agent i, then reportsRi(z, t) to mechanismMz according to the following
rule:
Ri(z, t) =
θit, if Yi(z, t) = 1d(θit) ∈ Θ, otherwise
In other words, if Yi(z, t) = 1, agent i is reporting truthfully to the mechanism and it is deviating
according to a known deviation if Yi(z, t) = 0. We assume that, the distribution of true types F and
the function of deviation d(·), are known or can be estimated from other sources1. Thus, assume
that d(θit) has a known distribution G. The agent strategy Yi(z, t) and report Ri(z, t) at each round
t are the potential outcomes of interest.
We consider a completely randomized experiment and denote the entire (N × 1) assignment
vector with Z. The full (N × 1) vector of potential outcomes of agent stratagies for mechanisms
M0 and M1 at round t, are denoted by Y0(t) and Y1(t) respectively. In a similar fashion, let
R0(t),R1(t) denote the potential reports of agents in mechanisms M0,M1 respectively. Note
that all the potential outcomes for agent strategies, Y0(t),Y1(t), are never observed and thus are
considered as missing. However, we make the following distinction: for an agent i with Zi =
z ∈ {0, 1}, the outcome Yi(z, t) will be realized but will not be observed whereas the outcome
Yi(1 − z, t) will not be realized at all. The subvector of Y0(t) with the realized outcomes for
M0 is denoted by Yreal0 (t). Similarly, the vector of realized outcomes for M1 is denoted by
Yreal1 (t). In contrast, some of the potential outcomes of the reports of agents are observed under
the mechanisms they participate in. Let Robs0 (t) denote the subvector of R0(t), for those agents i
such that Zi = 0, andRobs1 (t) be the subvector ofR1(t) for agents i with Zi = 1.
The “Science” table of the observed and unobserved quantities in the aforementioned experi-
ment is shown in Table 1. We can now define the causal estimand of interest:
Definition 2.1 (Causal effects on incentives). The causal effect on incentives of mechanism M1
over mechanismM0 in round t, is defined by:
∆(t) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Yi(1, t)− Yi(0, t) (1)
1For example, in the ad auction literature bidder valuations can be routinely estimated from the data using empirical
distribution of bids and prices (Athey & Nekipelov, 2010; Ostrovsky & Schwarz, 2011)
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Table 1: Science table of potential outcomes. Outcomes of agent strategies Yi(z, t) are all missing
and reports Ri(z, t) are only observed when Zi = z.
M0 M1
Units Z R0(t) Y0(t) R1(t) Y1(t)
1 0 R1(0, t) ? ? ?
2 0 R2(0, t) ? ? ?
· · · · · · · · ·
N -1 1 ? ? RN−1(1, t) ?
N 1 ? ? RN(1, t) ?
The estimand ∆(T ) is defined as the long-term effect on agent incentives.
2.1 Discussion
Recall that Yi(z, t) denotes the strategy of agent i (1=truthful, 0=deviating) it mechanismMz at
round t. Therefore, the estimand ∆(t) defined in (1) compares the proportions of truthful agents
in M1 compared to M0 and by definition, it holds that ∆(t) ∈ [−1, 1]. Other options for the
definition of the estimand are available as well (e.g. median of difference) and in general it would
involve a “contrast function” h(Y1(t),Y0(t)) that will summarize the difference between the two
vectors. We will use this notion of contrast function throughout the rest of this paper, but for all
numerical purposes we will assume this is the difference in means as in Definition 1.
Note also that the estimand is time-dependent as we expect agents to be self-interested and adapt
their strategy over repeated rounds. The long-term effect ∆(T ) is trying to capture this dynamic
evolution of agent strategies over a specified time horizon T that is considered enough time for the
system to reach an economic equilbrium. This is related to the study of equilibrium effects in the
econometric literature (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005).
3 Causal Inference
Inspection of Table 1 reveals one major technical challenge. Since we do not observe the actual
strategies of agents (i.e., their “truthfulness” status) but only their reports, no potential outcomes of
strategies Yi(z, t) are actually observed. However, given strategies Yi(z, t) the potential outcomes
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on reports Ri(z, t) have a well-defined distribution2.
p(Y1(t),Y0(t)|Robs1 (t),Robs0 (t),Z) ∝ L(Robs1 (t),Robs0 (t)|Y0(t),Y1(t))
×pi(Y0(t),Y1(t)) (2)
The likelihood term L(Robs1 (t),Robs0 (t)|Y0(t),Y1(t)) is easy to obtain based on our assump-
tions. Specifically, we have assumed that report Ri(z, t) has distribution F if agent i is truthful and
has distribution G if it is deviating. Hence:
L(Robs1 (t),Robs0 (t)|Y0(t),Y1(t)) =L(Robs1 (t)|Y1(t))× L(Robs0 (t)|Y0(t))
Therefore, by independence, it holds for j ∈ {0, 1} indexing mechanismMj:
L(Robsj (t)|Yrealj (t)) =
∏
i:Zi=j
f(Ri(j, t))
Yi(j,t)g(Ri(j, t))
1−Yi(j,t) (3)
Hence, causal inference depends critically on the model of pi(Y0(t),Y1(t)). The main contribu-
tion of this paper is to consider a prior on potential outcomes that has a game-theoretic justification
through a well-defined equilibrium model. The main idea is that, by doing so, we will shrink
estimates from data observed at an early round towards the long-term effects, assuming that the
equilibrium model is accurate enough to describe the dynamics of the economic system. To illus-
trate our method we will compare it with a straightforward imputation method the is based on a
uniform prior. More options, such as a fully-Bayesian approach are discussed later.
3.1 Empirical method: Imputation on uniform prior of realized outcomes
This method, dubbed the empirical method, serves as our baseline method and works in two steps.
First, we impute the realized (but missing outcomes) Yreal1 (t),Y
real
0 (t) assuming a uniform prior.
Second, we impute the non-realized and missing outcomesYnreal0 (t),Y
nreal
1 (t) through the empirical
distribution of the imputed realized outcomes. This algorithmic process (shown next) is repeated
many times and estimates of the causal effects are used for summarization.
2Since we operate under a completely randomized experiment, the assignment mechanism p(Z| · · · ) is uncon-
founded and the vector Z can be omitted for brevity.
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Initialize ∆ = array of length n
For j = 1, 2, · · ·n
Impute all missing potential outcomes for strategies as follows:
Yreal1 (t) ∼ L
(
Robs(1, t)|Yreal1 (t)
)
Ynreal1 (t) ∼ Yreal1 (t) (use empirical distribution)
Yreal0 (t) ∼ L
(
Robs(0, t)|Yreal0 (t)
)
Ynreal0 (t) ∼ Yreal0 (t) (use empirical distribution)
Y1(t) = (Ynreal1 (t),Yreal1 (t))
Y0(t) = (Yreal0 (t),Ynreal0 (t))
Causal effect estimate ∆ˆj(t) = h(Y1(t),Y0(t))
Return ∆
Algorithm 1: Causal inference on incentives through uniform priors. Unrealized outcomes are
sampled from the empirical distribution of the imputed realized ones. Variable n is the # of
samples.
The estimate of causal effects on incentives from the empirical method is given by:
∆̂(t) =
1
n
∑
j
∆ˆj(t) (4)
One critical implicit assumption underlying the imputation of non-realized outcomes from re-
alized ones, is that collective behavior is somehow “homegeneous” in a mechanism. For example,
if 2 out of 10 agents are truthful on average, then we expect 4 agents to be truthful out of 20.
3.2 Game-theoretic method: Imputation using a game-theoretic prior
Typical causal inference methods, such as the aforementioned one, are usually criticized that they
ignore incentives in a multi-agent system (Heckman & Vytlacil, 2005). However, in this work we
show that the Rubin causal model can be adapted to address this issue. Before we proceed, we
make the following assumption:
Assumption 3.1 (Best-response behavior). Given no prior information, the potential outcomes on
agent strategies are independent for every round i.e.,Y1(t) ⊥ Y0(t),∀t.
Assumption 3.1 can be thought as a consequence of assuming that agents are best-responding,
regardless of behaviors in other mechanisms. This assumption would be invalid in several cases,
for example, when agents have different propensities to be truthful or lie to a mechanism. We will
offer more discussion later in the paper.
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Assuming independence, we only need to model pi(Y0(t)) and, similarly, pi(Y1(t)). Recall that
in any mechanism, sayM1, the expected utility of agent i choosing strategy Yi(z, t) = y assuming
fixed behaviors from other agents Y1,−i(t) is denoted by ui(y,Y1,−i(t)). Therefore the expected
utility benefit from being truthful for agent i is given by
∆ui(Y1,−i(t)) = ui(1,Y1,−i(t))− ui(0,Y1,−i(t)) (5)
We adopt a quantal response equilbrium (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1995; Goeree et al., 2003)
model in order to construct our game-theoretic prior. In specific, agent i facing a vector of agent
strategies, will randomize over the available actions according to a softmax rule that depends on
the expected utilities. In specific, for a mechanismMz at round t, agent i facing fixed behaviors
from other agents Yz,−i(t), will select to be truthful according to the probability:
pi(Yi(z, t) = 1|Yz,−i(t)) ∝ exp (β · ui(1,Yz,−i(t))) (6)
Hence:
pi(Yi(z, t) = 1|Yz,−i(t)) = 1
1 + exp (β ·∆ui(Yz,−i(t)))
Quantal response equilbrium is a well-studied model of utility-based agent behavior that has
been shown to converge to Nash equilibria under certain mild conditions (McKelvey & Palfrey,
1995). The choice of parameter β > 0 is critical3. If β is high then the agent has a strong preference
for actions with better expected utilities. In the extreme case, if β is very high then the agent simply
prefers the best action (so adopts a best-response strategy). We will discuss the choice of β in the
experimental section. Note also that there are N functions ui(·) and each needs to be evaluated at
2N−1 points since the outcome is binary. For large populations this computation is prohibitive. To
circumvent this problem we need to make the following exchangeability assumption:
Assumption 3.2 (Exchangeability among agents). Agents are exchangeable so that inferences are
invariant to permutations of agent labels.
The main consequence of the exchangeability assumption is that the expected utility ui(·) are
the same for all agents. Furthermore, the expected utility of an agent depends only on the num-
ber of truthful agents he is “competing” against and so ∆ui(Yz,−i(t)) = ∆u(
∑
j 6=i Yj(z, t)). In
other words, there is only one function ∆u(·) for each agent that needs to be evaluated at N + 1
3If β < 0 that would be considered irrational since the agent would prefer actions with smaller expected utilities
than others.
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points (having 0 to N truthful agents in total). Inference can now be performed through Gibbs
sampling. The implementation is straightforward since strategy outcomes are binary. In summary,
if i participates in mechanism Mz, then potential outcome Yi(z, t) is sampled according to the
following rule: If the outcome is not-realized then only the report outcome Ri(z, t) is used (this is
observed) to sample the strategy. However, if the outcome is realized, then both the report Ri(z, t)
and the vector of agent behaviors Yz,−i(t) is used to sample Yi(z, t). The full procedure is given in
Algorithm 2.
Initialize ∆ = array of length n
For j = 1, 2, · · ·n
Initialize Y(j)0 (t) = Y
(j−1)
0 (t) and Y
(j)
1 (t) = Y
(j−1)
1 (t)
∀i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N} and z ∈ {0, 1}:
piiz =
(
1 + exp
(
β∆u(
∑
j 6=i Yj(z, t))
))−1
piz =
{
L(Ri(z, t)|Y (j)i (z, t) = 1), if Zi = 1− z
L(Ri(z, t)|Yi(z, t) = 1)× piiz, if Zi = z
Sample Y (j)i (z, t) = 1 with probability piz
Causal effect estimate ∆ˆj(t) = h(Y
(j)
1 (t),Y
(j)
0 (t))
Return ∆
Algorithm 2: Causal inference on incentives through a game-theoretic prior. Inference per-
formed though Gibbs sampler. Each sample is indexed by j. Variable n is the # of samples.
4 Application on Kidney exchanges
4.1 Preliminaries
Kidney exchanges (Roth et al., 2004) enable kidney transplantations when donors are incompatible
with recipients. In particular, a pair of a donor and a recipient who are incompatible can exchange
a kidney transplant with a pair of donor/recipient, provided that the donor from one pair can donate
to the patient of the other. Incompatilibility is determined by two medical tests. The first is one is
a blood-type test between the donor and the recipient. The second test is a sensitivity test which
shows whether the recipient will accept or reject the kidney transplant from the donor. The statistics
of these compatibilities are well studied and we will assume them to be known 4. Typically, these
exchanges involve 2 pairs due to logistical issues, however it is also common to perform cycle
4For example, it is known that the probability that a random patient will reject a kidney of a random donor is about
0.11 and this is 3x as high when the recipient is a woman who has been pregnant and the donor is her spouse.
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exchanges in which a donor donates to the recipient of another pair, in sequence, until a loop is
formed. Multiple regional exchange programs currently operate in the US and the world, however,
their expansion has hitherto been hindered by logistical and mechanism inefficiency issues. In
specific, it has been reported that manipulation of centralized kidney exchange markets is possible
and is performed by participating hospitals (Ashlagi et al., 2010). Work in mechanism design
has focused on mechanisms that resolve such incentives issues (Ashlagi & Roth, 2011; Toulis &
Parkes, 2011; Ashlagi et al., 2010).
The kidney exchange problem fits the framework of this paper as follows. First, we assume N
hospitals and we assume the existence of two mechanisms M0 and M1. The former, M0, can
be considered as the mechanism currently in practice whereasM1 is a new proposed mechanism
under test. Agents are hospitals that are randomly assigned to participate in an exchange mech-
anism. This exchange is multi-round (e.g. once per month) as it usually happens in practice. At
each round t, each hospital samples a donor/patient pool of fixed size. This pool can be represented
by a set of donor/patient pairs such that in each pair the donor is willing to donate to the patient
but they are incompatible. Given such set, compatibilities can be determined by medical tests that
are assumed common knowledge i.e., hospitals cannot hide compatibilities between pairs, as that
would be unethical and easy to uncover. Thus, the sampled type of the hospital θit is simply the
set of donor/recipient pairs that were sampled at round t. At each round, the hospital decides be-
tween two strategies: in the truthful strategy, Yi(z, t) = 1, the hospital reports Ri(z, t) = θit. In
the deviating strategy, Yi(z, t) = 0 and the hospital performs all possible matches among its own
pairs internally, and then reports the remainder Ri(z, t) = d(θit). Given a pool of donor/patients
θit, the function d(.) is deterministic. Furthermore, as mentioned before, compatibility statistics
are well-documented in the medical literature, and so the distributions of θit and d(θit) (F and G
respectively) are assumed known5.
4.2 Simulation Setup
We perform simulation of two realistic stylized kidney exchange models that have been studied in
literature. Mechanism M0 is the baseline mechanism and given a joint pool of hospital reports,
computes a random maximum matching over all pairs. Mechanism M1 applies the revelation
principle along with some more detailed allocations in well-defined subgroups of donor/patient
5For example, a pair with a donor with blood-type O is one that can possibly perform many exchanges, since O-
donors can donate to all blood-types. Therefore, we expect more O-donors under distribution F than distribution G,
since when deviating, hospitals are more likely to match these “good” pairs internally.
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pairs6. Random graph theory has been leveraged to show that M0 is vulnerable to deviating
hospitals while inM1 hospitals are better-off by being truthful (Toulis & Parkes, 2011).
As a ground-truth model of agent strategic behavior, we adopt a multi-armed bandit formula-
tion. Specifically, we assume that hospitals try to maximize their utility (number of total pairs
matched) by using the uniform confidence bound algorithm. This algorithm has been widely used
in practice as the simplest and most effective model of dynamic strategic behavior with bounded
regret (Auer et al., 2002). The algorithm used to generate the dataset is shown in Algorithm 3.
For ∀ hospital i,∀s ∈ {0, 1}
uis = 0
nis = 1
For t = 1, 2, · · ·T
For i = 1, 2, · · ·N
θit ∼ F , sample the hospital’s internal pairs
s∗ = arg maxs∈{0,1}
(
uis +
√
2 log t
nis
)
Yi(z, t) = s
∗
nis∗ = nis∗ + 1
Ri(Zi, t) =
{
θit, if Yi(z, t) = 1
d(θit), otherwise
Causal effect estimand ∆(t) = h(Y1(t),Y0(t))
Return ∆(t),Robs1 (t),R
obs
0 (t),∀t
Algorithm 3: Simulation model of dynamic hospital behavior in kidney exchanges. Variable nis
keeps track of how many times hospital i has chosen strategy s (1=truthful). Variable uis keeps
track of the average achieved utility of agent i by playing strategy s.
The output of the simulation of Algorithm 3 are the causal estimand values at different rounds
t and the observed agent reports ((N/2 × 1) vectors of observed hospital reports for each t). Our
inference goal for both the empirical and the game-theoretic methods will be to estimate the esti-
mand values ∆(t) produced by the simulation, given the observed reports, for two specific rounds:
t1 = 5 will be round when the data are collected (observe agents’ reports) and t2 = T = 100 will
be considered as the round where the system has reached equilibrium. Figure 1 shows 100 inde-
pendent runs of the simulation with the multi-armed bandit dynamic and the confidence bands of
the respective estimand values ∆(t) for every round t. Note that the causal effects to be estimated
6Briefly, pairs can be categorized as “under-demanded”, ”over-demanded”, “reciprocal” and “self-demanded”. The
compatibility networks within these groups vary significantly. The “under-demanded” cannot be matched to each other
and so the subgroup network is isolated. The “reciprocal” subgroup consists of two smaller groups that can be matched
to each other and so the network is bipartite. The “self-demanded” is composed of four smaller groups that internally
look like complete graphs. These nuisances can be leveraged for the design of better allocation mechanisms than
myopic maximum matchings.
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are time-dependent. For example, at round t = 5, the difference in incentives is around 0.1, specif-
ically 0.5 forM1 and 0.4 forM0, which means that hospitals inM1 are 25% more likely to play
the truthful strategy (t) compared to M0 at round 5 and under the multi-armed bandit dynamic.
For larger t this value steadily increases until 0.44 and then stabilizes (based on additional experi-
ments, we believe the seemingly linear trend at later time points, is an artifact of our simulation).
The complication for causal inference is that unbiased estimates of incentives, taken at different
timepoints, would be wildly different. This illustrates that estimation of mechanism effects needs
to make the distinction between short-term and long-term. One key goal of this paper is to propose
a methodology to estimate long-term effects by early experimental data. In our simulation, we
assume that data are collected at t = 5 and we are interested in estimating the short term effect
∆(5) and long-term effect ∆(100).
Figure 1: Causal estimand at different rounds t average over 100 independent runs. The estimand
is time-dependent indicating that the system reaches equilibrium over time.
4.3 Estimation
We compare between the empirical method that uses uniform priors and our method which is using
a game-theoretic prior. The former is straightforward and can be implemented by following Algo-
rithm 1. The implementation of our method is a bit more involved as it first requires to compute
the payoff functions ∆u(·) as put forth in Equation (5) and under the exchangeability assumption
(Assumption 3.2). In our simulation, this means that we have to calculate the payoff matrices for 9
cases. These can be obtained through simulations. The results over 10,000 mechanism simulations
are shown in Table 2. For example, inM0 a truthful hospital will have an expected utility of 9.66
matches when there are 5 truthful hospitals out of N = 8. Thus if this hospital were to deviate,
it would obtain an expected utility of 10.69 since the number of truthful hospital would decrease
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Table 2: Payoff matrices of M0 and M1. Each cell in the matrix shows the expected utility
(average number of matched pairs) given (i) a mechanism, (ii) number of truthful hospitals in the
mechanism and (iii) an agent strategy. The table shows that in M0 it is better for hospitals to
deviate and inM1 it is better to be truthful.
M0 M1
expected utility expected utility
truthful deviating #truthful truthful deviating #truthful
- 9.76 0 - 9.58 0
8.24 10.06 1 9.94 9.61 1
8.71 10.37 2 9.82 9.54 2
9.07 10.49 3 9.91 9.66 3
9.31 10.69 4 9.75 9.68 4
9.66 10.76 5 9.86 9.78 5
9.87 10.91 6 9.83 9.88 6
10.15 11.21 7 9.89 9.85 7
10.30 - 8 9.88 - 8
to 4. Table 2 shows that deviation is a dominant stratefy inM0 and truthful strategy is dominant
strategy inM1.
Having obtained the payoff matrices, estimation through our model proceeds through the simple
Gibbs sampling procedure described in Algorithm 3.
4.4 Results
We conduct two experiments and for each experiment we collect agent reports at t = 5 and wish to
estimate short-term effects at t = 5 and long-term effects for T = 100. The ground truth estimands
have simulated values ∆(5) = 0.1 and ∆(100) = 0.44 over 500 independent simulation runs.
In our first experiment, we work on a case in which agent reports are highly informative of
the underlying agent behaviors. We refer to this case as “strong separability” since the posterior
distributions Yi(z, t)|Ri(z, t) takes higher values (around 1) when the report is a truthful one and
take small values (around 0) when the report is an untruthful one. In this cases the distributions
look “separated” as in Figure 2a.
Figure 2b shows histograms of the estimates from the empirical method and the game-theoretic
method. We can see that the former estimates ∆(5) at 0.12. Visual inspection of the estimates
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(a) Conditional distribution of agent strat-
egy conditioned on truthful report (light
gray) or untruthful report (dark gray).
(b) Causal effects estimates from the em-
pirical method (light gray) and the game-
theoretic (GT) method (dark gray).
Figure 2: Experiment in which agent reports are informative of agent strategies (strong separabil-
ity). Ground truth estimands have simulated values ∆(5) = 0.1 and ∆(100) = 0.44.
shows that the method performs well under the informative agent reports (strong separability).
This is expected, since the likelihood gives plenty of information about the missing agent strategies.
However, while the estimate (under the exchangeability assumption) is unbiased for the true effect
∆(5) at round t = 5, it is still biased for the long-term effect ∆(100). The game-theoretic method
makes a compromise between the two estimands. The estimates are centered around 0.27 and
they clearly biased for the effect at t = 5. However, they are also shrinked towards the long-term
effect ∆(100) which indicates that the payoff matrix is able to capture the dynamic evolution of
the system to a certain extent.
In our second experiment, we work on a case in which agent reports are not informative about
the underlying agent behaviors. We refer to this case as “weak separability” since the posterior
distributions Yi(z, t)|Ri(z, t) takes values around 0.5 for both truthful and untruthful reports so that
there is practically no information about strategies given observed agents’ reports. The respective
distributions are shown in Figure 3a.
Figure 3b shows histograms of the estimates from the empirical method and the game-theoretic
method for the weak separability case. We can see that the former estimates ∆(5) at 0.02. In that
case, we observe a breakdown of the empirical method since the estimates are centered around
zero. This is because the reports are not informative (almost random guesses) about the strategies
and so the empirical method is using only the information on the prior to make inference about
incentives. However, since the empirical method is assuming a uniform prior, the overall procedure
will deduce no difference in incentives. In constrast, the game-theoretic method is actually giving
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(a) Conditional distribution of agent strat-
egy conditioned on truthful report (light
gray) or untruthful report (dark gray).
(b) Causal effects estimates from the em-
pirical method (light gray) and the game-
theoretic (GT) method (dark gray).
Figure 3: Experiment in which agent reports are informative of agent strategies (strong separabil-
ity). Ground truth estimands have simulated values ∆(5) = 0.1 and ∆(100) = 0.44.
higher estimates for the overall difference in incentives since it is based only on the equilibrium
model of the prior. Thus, the overall estimates are even higher than before (average around 0.33)
as the equilibrium model shrinks the estimates towards long-term effects.
5 Discussion
The evaluation of mechanisms is critical in numerous socioeconomic problems. However, this is
technically challenging because multi-agent systems are dynamic by nature and estimation should
be performed with respect to an equilbrium state of the system. Furthermore, in estimating effects
of incentives, there are additional challenges as agent strategies, which are the main potential
outcomes of interest, are typically never observed. For the former, we use agent reports and further
distributional assumptions to obtain likelihoods of strategies given observed reports. For the latter,
we propose a prior on agent strategies that is based on a quantal response equilibrium model. In
a simulated study, this was shown to shrink towards long-term effects, thus offering improved
inference over methods that don’t consider such priors.
There are multiple ways that this work could be further improved. First, the empirical method
we described is by now means the only way that could be used to perform causal inference. A
fully Bayesian model would also be a good choice. However, this work hints that any model that is
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ignoring the game-theoretic aspect of the potential outcomes (agent behaviors) will be inadequate
to capture the time dependence of the causal estimand. Second, the choice of the β parameter in
the game-theoretic prior is crucial and how it was set, was not sufficiently justified. In practice, β
was set based on a heuristic calculation and experimental results. Future work would be benefited
by a more principled way to set such hyperparameters. Third, we offered limited discussion of our
assumptions (best-response and exchangeability). Several violations of these assumptions yield
more realistic and particularly interesting situations. For example, in case of substitution effects
i.e., cases where agents can switch between mechanisms (e.g. assume that a mechanism is a mode
of transportation), it is no longer possible to model the two potential outcome vectors indepen-
dently. Last but not least, agent interactions (e.g. information sharing, communication, collusion)
will require more sophisticated models.
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